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David Millon*

Shareholder Primacy in the Classroom After the
Financial Crisis

In the wake of the financial crisis, most corporate law reform efforts have
focused on the interests of shareholders. Controversial proposals include proxy
access, say on pay and other reforms aimed at excessive executive compensation,
elimination of staggered boards, and regulation of hedge funds.1 Such proposals
reflect the widely held assumption that the primary purpose of corporate activity —
and therefore also the primary responsibility of corporate managers and the
primary task for corporate law — is to maximize the shareholders’ returns on their
investments.2 As a legal doctrine, this is, of course, known as the shareholder
primacy principle.
The assumption that shareholder primacy is a doctrine of corporate law is
pervasive. Mainstream legal academics, often law-and-economics oriented, typically
take this for granted.3 (This may be changing. Criticism of shareholder primacy
from a policy perspective may be infiltrating faculties at leading law schools as
concerns about short-termism draw increasing support outside the legal academy.4)

© 2013 David Millon
* J.B. Stombock Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. An earlier version of this piece
appeared in The Conglomerate Blog: Business, Law, Economics & Society at http://www.theconglomerate.org
/2011/07/corporationsba-roundtable-.html. This essay was developed after the Discussion Group on Teaching
Business Law in a New Economic Environment at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting
on August 3, 2012.
1. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–203, § 951(a),
(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (requiring shareholder vote on executive compensation under some
circumstances).
2. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP.
L. 975, 977–79 (2006) (defining and describing the shareholder primacy principle).
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 419–21 (2002); ROBERT
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 17–19, 677–81 (1986); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of
History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 440–41 (2001); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the
Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON
L. REV. 23, 23 (1991).
4. For concerns discussed outside the legal academy, see John C. Bogle, Restoring Faith in Financial
Markets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2010, at A25 (“[T]he folly of short-term speculation has replaced the wisdom of
long-term investing.”); Dominic Barton, Capitalism for the Long Term, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2011, at 85
(criticizing “quarterly capitalism”); Francesco Guerrera, Welch Denounces Corporate Obsessions, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 13, 2009, at 1 (quoting General Electric’s former CEO, Jack Welch, as describing
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Shareholder primacy is also a foundational dogma at the top business schools, as
Khurana explains in his excellent book on the history of business education.5 The
business press similarly takes shareholder primacy for granted,6 and it is commonly
though not universally embraced by business leaders,7 investors, politicians, and
government regulators.
In fact, shareholder primacy is not a legal doctrine. Beyond the anomalous case
of Dodge v. Ford,8 it is virtually impossible to find authority for it.9 Even so,
shareholder primacy operates as a powerful social norm that generates significant
social costs. It seems clear that one of the engines driving the reckless behavior that
led to the financial crisis was the desire to enhance shareholder returns even if that
meant pursuit of excessively risky investment strategies.10 More generally, it is
widely recognized that many major corporations are fixated on quarterly earningsper-share, in large part because major institutional investors base their investment
strategies on a short-term perspective. (There are a number of reasons for this.11 For
example, public and private pension funds are desperate for cash to meet their own
obligations to retirees, especially in an economic environment of reduced public
and corporate contributions to pension plans. Similarly, mutual funds compete for
investor dollars on the basis of annual and quarterly rather than longer-term
performance.) Commitment to short-term shareholder value has significant
negative implications for the long-term viability of large corporations, because it
discourages investments in research and development,12 marketing, customer
service, and other initiatives and projects that reduce current earnings and only
“shareholder value [as] the dumbest idea in the world”). For examples of prominent academics critical of
shareholder primacy, see LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the
Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005).
5. See RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION (2007).
6. See, e.g., Aneel Karnani, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2010, at
R1 (“The movement for corporate social responsibility is in direct opposition . . . to the movement for better
corporate governance, which demands that managers fulfill their fiduciary duty to act in the shareholders’
interest.”).
7. See, e.g., BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2012 at 30 (2012); Orit
Gadiesh, Say It Loud, Say It Proud — ‘Shareholder Value!,’ WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2004, at B7 (citing a number of
CEOs who identify shareholder value as a priority for their companies).
8. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 301
(“Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. was a highly unusual case.”).
9. See STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 4, at ch. 2.
10. See Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309 (2011)
(explaining how excessive risk-taking in pursuit of short-term shareholder profits led to financial crisis).
11. See generally David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan.
2013).
12. Brian J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73
ACCOUNTING REV. 305 (1998).
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generate pay-offs in the long run.13 For the same reasons, corporations are also less
likely to invest in stakeholder well-being — such as employee training, improved
working conditions, and cultivation of supplier and customer welfare — even
though the company’s long-run sustainability may actually depend on such
investments.14
Given the widespread endorsement of the shareholder primacy idea in the
academic and business arenas, it seems to me important that we law teachers do
what we can to disabuse students of the assumption that corporate law requires that
corporate activity prioritize shareholder interests. Many of them have heard this
already and all of them are going to hear it once they get of law school if they are
paying attention. One way to do this is to point out in the business organizations
courses the fallacy of the view that shareholder primacy is a legal doctrine.
At Washington and Lee we divide the basic business organizations course into
two parts. The first is a three-credit Close Business Arrangements (CBA) course
that covers agency, partnership, corporate law in the close corporation context, and
LLCs. Virtually all our students enroll in this elective course. Publicly Held
Businesses (PHB) is a three-credit follow-on course that is essentially an advanced
course in Delaware corporate law. In addition to full coverage of fiduciary duties
and derivative actions, it is also possible to cover in greater detail than usual
mergers and acquisitions, hostile takeovers, preferred stock, corporate debt,
valuation, and also federal law as it relates to voting and disclosure.
The question of corporate purpose and shareholder primacy is less salient in
CBA than it is in PHB. Because there is usually a strong degree of unity of
ownership and control, those in charge of closely held firms are much less likely to
possess the discretion or the inclination to deviate from profit maximization and, if
they do, they do it with the consent of their fellow investors so there is typically no
one to complain about it. Significant externalities (e.g., environmental or human
rights costs) are less likely because of the generally smaller scale of closely held
businesses. Even so, there are opportunities to interrogate the shareholder primacy
assumption in the closely held context by introducing students to the benefit (or

13. See Andrew G. Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, & Richard Davies, Economist
Financial Stability Financial Institutions Division, Bank of England, The Short Long, Speech at the 29th Société
Universitaire Européene de Recherches Financières Colloquium: New Paradigms in Money and Finance? 14
(May 2011), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2011/
speech495.pdf (referring to short-termism as “a market failure . . . [that] would tend to result in investment
being too low and in long-duration projects suffering disproportionately”); THE ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOCIETY
PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2 (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/
files/content/docs/bsp/overcome_short_state0909.pdf (“[B]oards, managers, shareholders with varying
agendas, and regulators, all, to one degree or another, have allowed short-term considerations to overwhelm the
desirable long-term growth and sustainable profit objectives of the corporation.”).
14. See David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523 (2011)
(discussing importance of investment in stakeholder well-being for long-run corporate sustainability).
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“B”) corporation alternative.15 It may also be useful to bring up constituency
statutes16 and reforms like Oregon’s 2007 revision to its corporate statute
authorizing corporations to include in their articles of incorporation a provision
allowing or requiring management consideration of environmental and social
values.17 Even if most small businesses are likely to focus on profit as the
predominant objective, it would be good for students to understand that this is not
a legal mandate.
The shareholder primacy question is primarily a problem for publicly held
corporations. I address it on day one in my PHB course and come back to it
periodically throughout the semester. I do not spend a lot of time with the political
or moral question of whether large corporations have an obligation to temper profit
maximization with pursuit of conflicting objectives. Such discussions at this stage in
the course tend to be uninformed and to devolve fairly quickly into little more than
expressions of previously held political preferences. I do, though, want the students
to see that the size and the scope of the operations of our largest corporations
necessarily mean that there are substantial and potentially negative effects on the
wider society in which they operate. I think the students also need to know that
there is significant support abroad for the idea that large businesses have social
responsibilities, even if that idea seems more marginal in this country. So I start the
course by explaining the shareholder primacy conception of corporate purpose and
management responsibility (Dodge v. Ford is a useful illustration of what can be at
stake) and then contrast that conception with the idea of corporate social
responsibility (CSR) as a competing alternative that is taken seriously in many
18
quarters around the world. I make no effort to resolve what is essentially a
controversy over social policy or moral obligation, but I do want students to know
that important choices about those questions are embedded in a commitment to
shareholder primacy.
While I do not try to convert students to my way of thinking about CSR, I do
think it is very important that they understand that corporate law — this is
supposed to a course about law, after all — is ambivalent on the question of
shareholder primacy, generally agnostic, at best conflicted, and at times even
hostile. (My colleague Christopher Bruner’s articles on this subject are important.19)
There are several opportunities to point this out. For example, state statutes

15. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 591 (2011).
16. See generally David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991).
17. OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047 (2007).
18. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle
and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 101 (2008) (noting the competing theories in corporate law
scholarship).
19. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385,
1421 (2008)
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authorize corporate philanthropy.20 Federal Rule 14a-8 allows shareholders to
communicate with each other about the social, political, or ethical implications of
what their firms are doing.21 The business judgment rule insulates from shareholder
scrutiny management policies aimed at promoting nonshareholder interests as long
as those policies can with at least minimal plausibility be said to further the longterm interests of the corporate entity.22 Corporations confronted by hostile
takeovers can take effects on nonshareholders into account in formulating defensive
responses (except in the narrowly-defined and readily avoidable Revlon situation23).
At the same time, even if the law does not require it, it does allow corporate
management to disregard nonshareholder interests and pursue short-term profit
maximization if it chooses to do so, as long as the corporation honors contracts and
complies with applicable regulations.
So corporate law ends up being irrelevant to the crucial question of corporate
purpose and management’s responsibility, leaving them largely within the
discretion of management itself. The students therefore need to understand that
non-legal values and incentives — including political commitment, social norms,
compensation arrangements, pressure from institutional shareholders, to name a
few — can lead corporate management to prioritize current share price
maximization over long-term strategic investment and cultivation of the well-being
of key nonshareholder constituencies. Even if this approach does not produce
another financial crisis, it has important implications for the future of our society.
As corporate law teachers, our powers are limited but we can at least do our best to
avoid perpetuating facile assumptions about shareholder primacy.

20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (West 2012).
21. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (2011) (“shareholder proposal rule” allowing shareholders to
communicate with each other by including proposals in management’s proxy solicitation materials under
certain circumstances).
22. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30–.31 (2002); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.
1985) (clarifying that “the business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the
managerial power granted to Delaware directors”).
23. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (stating that a
corporation’s concern “for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is
in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the
highest bidder”).
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